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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 13-1177, 13-1178 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VINCENT D. MIDDLEBROOKS, 
    Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-11-cr-00237-007 and No. 2-12-cr-00239-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 31, 2013 
  
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: February 12, 2015) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
Vincent D. Middlebrooks  appeals the sentences imposed following his guilty 
pleas for various drug-related offenses.  Middlebrooks claims that the District Court 
failed to sufficiently consider all of the pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing 
principles.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree and will affirm. 
I. 
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742.  Middlebrooks is asserting procedural error by the district court in not 
considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Ordinarily, where 
procedural error is asserted, the standard of review is for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  However, the government argues that plain error 
review is applicable here as Middlebrooks did not object for procedural error at 
sentencing. (Appellee Br. at 3.) 
In United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc), we held 
that “a defendant must raise any procedural objection to his sentence at the time the 
procedural error is made, i.e., when sentence is imposed without the court having given 
meaningful review to the objection.”  Id. at 256.  However, we also held that this new 
procedural requirement would not be applied retroactively. Id. at 259.  Flores-Mejia was 
decided on July 16, 2014.  Middlebrooks’ sentences were imposed on January 7, 2013, 
well before the decision in Flores-Mejia.  Accordingly, we will review for abuse of 
discretion. 
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“[A] district court abuses its discretion when it fails to give ‘meaningful 
consideration’ to an argument advanced by the defendant.”  Id.  “The record must 
disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of 
independent judgment, based on a weighing of the relevant factors, in arriving at a final 
sentence.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571–72 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing 
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329–32 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
II. 
District courts must engage in a three step sentencing process.  United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187 (3d 
Cir. 2006)).  The three steps are as follows: 
(1) Courts must . . . calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence . . . . (2) In 
doing so, they must formally rule on the motions of both parties and state 
on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure 
affects the Guidelines calculation . . . . (3) Finally, they are required to 
exercise their discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors in 
setting the sentence they impose regardless whether it varies from the 
sentence calculated under the Guidelines. 
 
Id.  (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Middlebrooks’ base offense level was 34.  (Supp. App.1 24 ¶ 2.)  This level was 
then increased by two levels because Middlebrooks was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(h).  (Supp.  App. 24 ¶ 3.)  Middlebrooks’ offense level was then decreased by two 
levels for his acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct.  (Supp. App. 24 ¶ 4.)  
The offense level was then decreased an additional level because he timely notified 
                                              
1 This abbreviation refers to the Supplemental Appendix submitted to this Court. 
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authorities of his intent to plead guilty.  (Supp. App. 24 ¶ 5.)  Thus, Middlebrooks’ total 
offense level was determined to be 33.  (Supp. Appl. 24 ¶ 6.) 
However, at the sentencing hearing, after considering that Middlebrooks was 
responsible for distributing at least a hundred and fifty kilograms of cocaine, the District 
Court determined that his base offense level was 38.  (App. 139.)  Applying the same 
additions and reductions, the District Court ultimately reduced the offense level to 37.  
(App. 139.)  Thus, with a criminal history category of I, the District Court concluded that 
the recommended Guidelines sentencing range is 210 to 262 months.  (App. 139.)  The 
district court imposed an aggregated sentence of 240 months imprisonment followed by a 
period of three years of supervised release. There does not appear to be any disagreement 
between the parties as to these calculations.  Rather, Middlebrooks claims that the 
District Court failed to consider all  § 3553(a) sentencing factors after the Guidelines 
sentencing range was determined. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth factors to be considered in imposing a criminal 
sentence.  Of the seven factors included in § 3553(a), only the first two are relevant here: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; [and] 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
 
 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
 the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
 
 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;  
 
 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and  
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 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
 training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
 effective manner . . . . 
  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
Middlebrooks alleges that the District Court’s sentence was “driven exclusively by 
the amount of cocaine involved in the offense” and “without addressing any of the           
§ 3553(a) factors.” 2  (Appellant Br. 8 (emphasis omitted).)  Middlebrooks claims that the 
District Court did not sufficiently consider that this was his first conviction, the lack of 
violence in the offenses, his long employment history, or his active involvement as a 
father.  (Appellant Br. 8–9.)  Further, Middlebooks claims that there is no evidence of 
great measures taken to avoid law enforcement or any sophistication to the drug 
operation, as the District Court claimed.  (Appellant Br. 7–8.)  Additionally, he claims 
that the District Court did not consider rehabilitation.  (Appellants Br. 8–9.)  Thus, 
Middlebrooks asks this Court to vacate and remand the District Court’s judgment because 
the District Court did not “engage in a real and meaningful § 3553(a) analysis.”  
(Appellant Br. 10.)  We disagree. 
As an initial matter, Middlebrooks is correct in arguing that the District Court’s 
sentence was largely driven by the amount of cocaine involved in the offense, but that 
was not to the exclusion of other pertinent factors.  Indeed, the District Court stated: “The 
enormous scope of the cocaine trafficking . . . demonstrates that a substantial sentence is 
needed.  This was a very large scale drug operation, involving hundreds of kilograms of 
                                              
2 Notably, Middlebrooks claims that the District Court failed to consider the relevant 
factors, while also claiming that he disagreed with its consideration of the factors. 
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cocaine . . . .”  (App. 145.)  Before making this statement, however, the District Court 
considered other factors that Middlebrooks incorrectly claims the District Court neglected 
to consider. 
With reference to Middlebrooks’ lack of criminal history, the District Court 
specifically referenced this factor before determining that it was not persuaded to reduce 
his sentence: 
[T]he fact that he has no prior convictions has been taken into account by 
the fact that he has been placed in the lowest possible criminal history 
category under the Guidelines and has thereby received a lower 
recommended sentencing range.  
 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that any additional reduction is 
warranted.  Indeed, although, defendant has no prior convictions, he has 
been involved with the criminal justice system before. And, as such, he is 
not significantly different from other defendants in Criminal History 
Category I.   
 
(App. 144–45.)  Thus, Middlebrooks’ claim that the District Court did not consider his 
lack of criminal history has no merit. 
With reference to Middlebrooks’ family life, the District Court stated that “nothing 
about his family life [ ] distinguishes him from the many criminal defendants whose 
relationships with their families are damaged by the criminal conduct.”  (App. 145.) 
Additionally, the District Court explained its denial to recommend Middlebrooks for the 
500-hour drug treatment program, referencing the high demand for the program and the 
inability to allow all who want to participate to do so.  (App. 146.)  The District Court 
stated that “[r]ecommending [Middlebrooks] for such a program when, at best, he has 
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minor issues with marijuana, may well deprive a more deserving inmate access to the 
program.”  (App. 146.) 
The District Court’s reference to the “relative sophistication of the [cocaine 
trafficking] operation” and the “great measures [taken] to avoid detection by law 
enforcement,” (App. 145), have ample support in the record.3  
Any objective reading of this record readily confirms that the District Court 
considered the relevant factors and the unique circumstances of this case before imposing 
sentence. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
Middlebrooks’ sentences. 
IV. 
Accordingly, we will affirm Middlebrooks’ sentences. 
                                              
3 The record reveals that the cocaine conspiracy had been ongoing since at least 
December 4, 2009, that Middlebrooks had traveled between Texas and Ohio to 
participate in the conspiracy, that a tractor trailer was utilized, and that multiple 
kilograms and millions of dollars worth of cocaine was involved.  (App. 55–57, 143.)  
Further, the scope of the investigation itself is evidence of Middlebrooks’ efforts to avoid 
detection by law enforcement.  (App. 54–57.) 
